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Unattended electronic PODs – can they really work?
The 24-7 Box, with tamper-proof code and transparent inner lid, demonstrates the principles of Andrew Nesling's solution

Yes, says Andrew Nesling, who goes back to grass roots in this illuminating article, revealing weaknesses in accepted practice for obtaining proof of delivery when the recipient is absent, and suggesting that an electronic substitute can be at least as robust

Probably the greatest problem for internet retailing today is delivery. Solve this and you will unlock the full potential of remote selling.

Some online sellers are now actively encouraging their customers to review their products and services via blog sites, social networking sites and so on; and this should largely solve the other main problem in consumers eyes: 'Can I trust this Retailer?'.

However, consumers will only buy if they can be sure they will get the goods quickly, undamaged and without any hassle. Our life styles have changed, and it can no longer be assumed that there will usually be someone at home to receive the goods. So how can delivery be made more convenient?

 

Unattended delivery solutions can go a long way towards solving this problem, but there are a number of key hurdles that have to be overcome for these to be successful.

The first thing to consider is what exactly has to be achieved during an unattended delivery episode. What would have happened if the recipient had been there to accept the goods, and can an unattended solution match or even improve on this process?

When receiving a delivery, a recipient will inspect the packaging visually for damage, and depending on the requirements of the order, may provide a signature to show they have received it.

The process of physically receiving the delivery largely solves the problem of trust that can arise between the recipient and the carrier when no one is at home. Both parties in effect share the risk.

The recipient will not usually accept the goods or provide a signature for the delivery if the packing is clearly damaged – and certainly won't accept it if there is no package at all! Equally, the carrier will not leave the package if it's not possible to gather the proof of delivery required from the recipient. By physically receiving the delivery, the recipient can also put the package somewhere known to be safe.

These features are therefore essential for any unattended delivery solution to be widely adopted.

Legally binding

When an unattended delivery is made and a signature is required, this has to be provided in the form of a fixed code or an electronic signature of one form or another. The question then is: will this be as good a proof of delivery as a handwritten signature, and will it be as legally binding?

To answer these questions we first have to look at what a handwritten signature actually provides in a delivery context. When a signature is provided for ANY reason, in order for it to be legally binding under EU or US law it must be proved that there was an INTENT TO SIGN.

This means that if it can be proved that a signature was provided under duress, or if it was not made clear to the person what they were signing for, then the signature is not legally binding.

Equally, if it can be proved that there was an 'intent to sign' but for whatever reason a signature was not recorded, then that is legally binding. However, proving that there was an 'intent to sign' without a physical signature can be extremely hard! That's the reason why in most practical situations where a signature is required, it is insisted upon.

Therefore as a minimum in any unattended delivery solution, it must be possible to prove that there was an intent to sign: in other words, that if the recipient had been present, he or she would have signed for the delivery.

Proving an intent to sign in the delivery context highlights a couple of issues arising from the way that signatures are currently obtained that are not at first obvious. Suppose, for instance, that a neighbour signs for a delivery on a recipient's behalf. In these circumstances it may not possible to prove that the recipient would have signed if they had been there – not unless the neighbour had previously been authorised by the recipient to sign for the delivery.

Inherent in the 'intent to sign' is also the assumption that the recipient knows exactly what he or she is signing for. Unless this is made very clear to the recipient, all that the signature proves is that they received 'a delivery'. It cannot prove that a specific delivery was received, or that it was received undamaged or complete.

In this area there is actually some scope for an unattended delivery solution to provide a more comprehensive proof of delivery than a handwritten signature.

Not tampered with

The other main hurdle to overcome when using a signature (electronic or not) is proving that what it was provided for has not been tampered with since the signature was provided, and that the signature itself is genuine.

Requirements for electronic signatures are laid down in Directive 1999/93/EC

Where the signature is handwritten on the item that needs validating, there are well established techniques for proving the validity of the item and signature, provided it is the original. Where the signature provided is electronic or digitised, this proof can become significantly more involved.

It is worth noting at this point that whenever a handwritten signature is written directly on to a screen or a paper copy of a signature is scanned into a computer, it immediately becomes an electronic signature; so the following applies to this type of signature as well as to more mechanical proofs.

In order for an electronic signature to be legally binding, it must be possible to prove that neither the signature nor what it was provided for has been modified in ANY way throughout the entire delivery system. The requirements for an 'advanced electronic signature' are laid out in the Electronic Signatures Directive 1999/93/EC, and state that:

• It must be 'uniquely linked' to the signatory

• It must be capable of identifying the signatory

• It must be created using a means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control

• It must be linked to data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of that data is detectable.

This effectively means that all the systems, software and hardware involved in dealing with the proof, from point of entry right through transmission to final storage and re-display, must be entirely robust.

Whilst companies such as VeriSign can provide such a service for documents and e-commerce, providing something similar in a delivery context would be a significant and expensive undertaking. The problem becomes even harder when the signature in question relates to an unattended delivery, since its format would have to be compatible with carriers' systems: not rocket science to achieve, but a further potential obstacle nonetheless.

In the light of all this, it is clear that legally speaking, there could be some gaping holes in existing practices – even with an attended delivery where a handwritten signature is recorded (but was not given by the recipient). Whilst these issues may not have been tested yet, arguably it would only take a single court case to render some current PODs legally worthless.

But does this mean that a legally binding unattended electronic POD is impossible to achieve? Or is there some way through the technological minefield? Well, it turns out the solution can be remarkably straightforward. The trick is to take the problem right back to its roots and keep it simple.

First, to you need to provide a means of demonstrating that an electronic proof of delivery has not been altered during the time between the item in question being left at the recipient's premises and the recipient returning to deal with it; and the answer here is to keep the electronic signature with the delivery. Then if the delivery is altered in any way (accepted by the recipient, for instance), the system changes the electronic signature automatically.

This works in exactly the same way as digitally signed documents, and does not rely on the integrity of the carrier's signature capture devices, storage or systems. Instead, the intelligence is embedded in the unattended delivery device itself.

Method of inspection

Second, to ensure that the recipient is not required to take all of the risk in the unattended delivery, you provide a method for recipients to inspect a delivery before accepting it. It is only when they do accept it that the electronic signature will be changed.

By following these two simple rules it is possible to present the carrier with an inexpensive, easy-to-maintain signature capture system in which only a code needs to be recorded.

Such a system also means that the recipient does not take all the risk on himself or herself if there is a problem. Whilst other solutions such as a permanent barcode in a drop-box or pre-signed acceptance slip might offset the risk for the carrier, these may not necessarily provide any corresponding safeguard for the recipient.

At 24-7 Box we stuck closely to these rules, and have developed a very inexpensive, patented technology that can be incorporated into any number of different unattended delivery solutions. The stage is now set for some real changes to unattended delivery which will unlock the full potential of e-retailing.

Andrew Nesling is the founder and head of 24-7 Box, whose unattended delivery solution has been designed to meet all the POD prerequisites he lays out in this article. For more information, including an electronic signature white paper, you can visit www.24-7box.com or contact Andrew Nesling on 07977 998497

 

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